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Abstract 
The resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany since reunification in 1990 
has been challenged by two peaks in asylum seeker applications in 1992 and again in 2016. From 
the 1992 peak, which was fueled by asylum seekers fleeing the former Yugoslavia, extensive 
research has already been conducted over the past thirty years. These studies have demonstrated 
the actual outcomes of these primarily Yugoslavian asylum seekers and refugees with these 
findings indicating legal and economic uncertainty having a detrimental effect even years after 
resettlement. Using Germany as a case study, this analysis aims to survey the available 
information in the more recent example of asylum seekers arriving in Germany from 2014 
onwards primarily from the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Ultimately, successful 
resettlement equates to successful integration measures. The issues of policy legacy and learning 
as well as elements of the available support network for asylum seekers in housing, 
Integrationskurse (integration courses), and advice centers are examined to understand how each 
relates to successful integration and security for asylum seekers. The findings indicate that 
Germany has achieved successful resettlement and integration of asylum seekers through policy 
learning from the early 1990’s onwards and a strong support network available for those seeking 
asylum, yet the exclusion of certain groups from integration measures unfairly leaves some 
behind. A continuous evaluation of these integration measures is necessary to ensure successful 
resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany in anticipated future peaks in asylum 
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I. Introduction  
At its founding, the United Nations prioritized the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written in 1948, guarantees “the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”1 Since the issuance of this 
declaration, the United Nations has issued further defining factors of who a refugee is in the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, often referred to as the Geneva Convention, 
and the subsequent 1967 Protocol which updated the 1951 Convention by removing geographic 
and time constraints.2 According to the definition established and agreed upon by the United 
Nations, a refugee is anyone who leaves their region or country based upon a “well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”3 Such persons are entitled then to apply for asylum through the 
appropriate channels, and then, if determined to be eligible, granted refugee status. Further laws 
have been established on the level of individual countries in order to identify what each country 
considers a person deserving of refugee status. The German constitution is the Grundgesetz für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany), also written 
in 1948, and it guarantees the right to seek asylum in Germany; Article 16a of the Grundgesetz 
asserts “persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.”4 The addition of 
this article to the basis of German law serves as a recognition of the 1948 democratic 
 
1 United Nations, 1948, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed February 15, 2021, 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights. 
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees,” accessed March 10, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. 
3 Ibid, 16.  
4 Parliamentary Council, 1948, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” Bundesministerium Der Justiz 
und für Verbraucherschutz, accessed April 12, 2021, https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg 
/englisch_gg.html. 
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government’s commitment to recognize and redress its Nazi past of political persecution within 
Germany.  
Conflict and political persecution today continue to create asylum seekers and refugees 
throughout the world. In 2020, an estimated eighty million people have been forcibly displaced 
with twenty-six million of these forcibly displaced persons additionally being classified as 
refugees.5 Both of these figures represent a historic high in the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) dataset which has gathered data from the year of its 
founding (1951) onwards. These statistics show the majority of refugees today originate from 
just five countries, including the Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, 
and Myanmar.6 Furthermore, 39% of the world’s refugees are hosted in a mere five countries, 
with these top host countries being Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda, and Germany.7 The 
four countries hosting the largest number of refugees directly border the conflicts which are 
producing the most refugees. Turkey, the country hosting the largest number of refugees as of 
2020, directly borders Syria. Colombia borders Venezuela, while Pakistan borders Afghanistan. 
Uganda then borders South Sudan. While these four countries share borders with these major 
areas of conflict, the case of Germany as the fifth largest host of refugees exists as an outlier. 
Germany does not directly border a country with conflict, yet it still is host to more than one 
million refugees as of mid-2020.8  
The 2015 European migration crisis brought about the entry of many of these one million 
refugees into Germany. This term has been heavily politicized with the word “crisis” evoking 
 
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Refugee Statistics,” Unhcr.org, accessed March 10, 2021, 
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid. 
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frightening images and a call for immediate action, yet calling this event a crisis is justified when 
considering the massive scale of the influx of asylum seekers to Germany after 2014. It was a 
crisis in a sense as it pushed the boundaries and abilities of the support networks in Germany as 
discussed throughout this analysis. Although those opposing refugee resettlement often use the 
word “crisis” to call for a decrease in asylum applications accepted, in some ways it was 
Germany’s moral obligation to accept these massive flows of refugees and asylum seekers in 
2015 as Germany is the wealthiest country in the European Union. Additionally, this seems even 
more of a moral obligation for Germany in considering the massive displacement from Europe’s 
worst refugee crisis in the 1940’s was spurred by Nazi Germany as a refugee creator and heavily 
affected ethnic Germans that were forced to flee or were expelled from Yugoslavia, Romania, 
and Czechoslovakia.9  
Asylum seekers and refugees are a particularly vulnerable population when considering 
the limbo inherent to their political status. Unable to return to their country of origin, many 
asylum seekers and refugees are left in temporary housing situations in neighboring countries 
with uncertain political statuses. These temporary living arrangements tend to only breed more 
problems—like violence and contagious diseases—for a population which has already endured 
tremendous hardship, and a more permanent solution that entitles the individual with refugee 
status to build a life through permanent housing and work is most often best for both the 
individual refugee and the host community. Asylum seekers are guaranteed protection under 
international law through intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, and 
individual governments have the opportunity to support asylum seekers by creating an 
environment in which the lives of asylum seekers are as stable and secure as possible during this 
 
9 Marina Koren, “A Brief History of Europe’s Worst Refugee Crisis,” Atlantic Monthly, September 1, 2015, 
accessed March 15, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/09/europe-refugee-crisis-war/403315/. 
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transitional period. In addition to the political limbo many asylum seekers find themselves in, 
other dangers present themselves in virtual misinformation and physical violence. Refugee 
resettlement and immigration in general serve as particularly salient topics and as such are the 
subject of misinformation and disinformation campaigns. During the German Federal election in 
2017, disinformation about the blatantly false “no-go zones” in Sweden that were supposedly 
host to hostile refugee communities where law enforcement could not enter spread virtually 
through sources including Sputnik Deutschland and other fringe media.10 Germany’s 
commitment to honoring the right to asylum outlined under international law has also met 
significant backlash from right-wing parties like Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for 
Germany) which have gained significant political traction in the immediate wake of the refugee 
crisis, with these parties now having the potential to create more restrictive asylum policy going 
forward with their newfound political power.11  
Unfortunately, anti-migrant, virtual rhetoric has real-life consequences outside of policy. 
Attacks on refugee centers and even an attack on a pro-asylum mayoral candidate in Cologne 
have left asylum seekers, refugees, and their supporters injured or even dead.12 The threat of such 
violence is very real, and rhetoric must be taken seriously. Right-wing extremist violence can 
potentially be motivated by anti-refugee sentiments, and in 2014 and 2015, Benček and 
Strasheim identified 1,645 events of right-wing violence and social unrest in Germany in their 
 
10 Jonathan Birdwell et al., “Smearing Sweden: International Influence Campaign in the 2018 Swedish Election,” 
London: Institue for Strategic Dialogue, 2018, accessed August 8, 2020, https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/Smearing-Sweden.pdf. 
11 Paul Hockenos, “Nothing Can Take down Angela Merkel — except 800,000 Refugees,” Foreign Policy, October 
22, 2015, accessed March 15, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/22/nothing-can-take-down-angela-merkel-
except-800000-refugees-germany-cdu-pegida/. 
12 Ibid. 
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dataset.13 This violence is not unique, and when there are large numbers of asylum seekers in 
Germany, subsequent rises in violence and attacks occur 
In considering refugee resettlement in Germany, the past thirty years reveal two peaks in 
asylum seeker applications. The first peak occurred in 1992 with the second occurring twenty-
four years later in 2016.14 While my research is concerned with evaluating the current situation 
of refugee resettlement from the 2016 peak onwards, it is essential to look to this first peak in 
asylum seeker applications in the early 1990’s caused by conflict and war in the former 
Yugoslavia to understand the basis of policies and practices in place affecting the more recent 
refugee crisis. These two peaks are unique and outstanding in their character. Both conflicts 
became crises due to the overwhelming number of refugees fleeing from particular regional 
conflicts, in 1992 from the former Yugoslavia and in 2016 from the Syrian Arab Republic. Now, 
six years after the start of the most recent migration crisis, we are at a point where we are able to 
pause and examine the recent past of refugee resettlement in Germany. 
 
Historical Background  
 The early 1990’s was a fragile period for Germany politically and socially. The 1989 fall 
of the Berlin Wall led to the reunification of a country divided for nearly forty-five years, and 
with that, flows of those wanting to emigrate from the five states (Bundesländer) of the former 
German Democratic Republic threatened the stability of social service support systems in the 
western Bundesländer.15 The influx of refugees out of the former Yugoslavia and into the newly 
 
13 David Benček and Julia Strasheim, "Refugees Welcome? A Dataset on Anti-Refugee Violence in Germany," 
Research & Politics 3, no. 4 (2016): 1-11, accessed January 25, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016679590. 
14 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, “Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2020 - Modul Asyl,” Bamf.de, accessed 
March 5, 2021, https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Statistik/BundesamtinZahlen/bundesamt-in-zahlen-
2020-asyl.html.  
15 Wolfgang Bosswick, “Development of Asylum Policy in Germany,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no. 1 (2000): 
47, accessed February 15, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.1.43.  
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unified Germany began in 1991 a mere year after the official reunification of Germany. These 
refugees tested not only a united Germany but also a united Europe; the breakup of Yugoslavia 
and the ensuing violence in the region served as a major test to a Europe no longer divided 
between East and West.16 Germany was drawn especially close to this conflict politically 
considering the long-standing historical connections Germany had with the Balkan region. 
German media in the early 1990’s focused heavily on this crisis drawing particular attention to 
the refugee question, and for the most part, Germans supported Croatians and Bosnians and 
shared a common consensus in wanting to stop Serbian infringement.17 Berlin called for the 
European Community (EC) to act, as these ethnic groups were asserting the same ideas of self-
determination that the citizens of the German Democratic Republic had only a few years prior. 
Officially, and against the wishes of the EC, Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia as 
independent states.18  
 Political recognition of these states, however, did not remedy the violence and 
displacement those in the region continued to face.  During the first half of the 1990’s, 700,000 
migrants from the former Yugoslavia arrived in Germany.19 These migrants were fleeing 
conflict, persecution, and political and economic instability, but few actually were considered 
asylum seekers or refugees. This was due to a number of factors, the first of which being the 
definition of a person with a right to asylum within the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
Grundgesetz specifically gives the right to asylum to those fleeing political persecution, but the 
 
16 Marten H. A. Van Heuven, "Testing the New Germany: The Case of Yugoslavia," German Politics & Society, no. 
29 (1993): 53, accessed January 4, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23735271.  
17 Ibid, 60.  
18 Ibid, 62-63.  
19 Dany Bahar et al., "Migration and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Effects of Returning Refugees on Export 
Performance in the Former Yugoslavia," Institute of Labor Economics (2019), accessed February 5, 2021, 
https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/12412/migration-and-post-conflict-reconstruction-the-effect-of-returning-
refugees-on-export-performance-in-the-former-yugoslavia.  
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broader definitions outlined by the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol are still recognized 
in Germany meaning those falling under this broad definition were legally given the right to stay 
within German borders while conflict and unrest persisted in the Balkans.20 In order to 
accommodate such cases, the Duldung (tolerated) legal status was created.21 Someone who has 
been granted Duldung in Germany merely has a tolerated stay permit and is at some point in the 
future legally required to leave the country, yet for the time being, the person with this status is 
granted a temporary reprieve from deportation. It is not equivalent to a residence permit and does 
not allow permanent residency. This status occupied and continues to occupy a peculiar situation 
in Germany, as those merely tolerated would, upon the decision of the German government of it 
being safe to resume deportation for the individual or to a particular country, be essentially 
forced to leave. Even yet, this status did have its benefits. Individuals with Duldung status were 
able to work and live in Germany wherever they pleased during this period, but if they were to 
file a formal case for asylum, they would be subject to mandatory residency requirements 
outlined under the Königsteiner Schlüssel (Königstein Quota).22 This quota system relies on a 
formula that determines the distribution of asylum seekers in Germany to individual 
Bundesländer. This percentage is based one third on the Bundesland’s population and two thirds 
on its tax revenue. Formal asylum seekers are directed to their assigned Bundesland for 
processing and must remain there under the mandatory residency requirement. 
 The intention of the Königsteiner Schlüssel is to ensure fair and equitable distribution of 
asylum seekers throughout the country, although the system did in the early 1990’s experience 
some backlash. Certainly, political backlash existed, but the starkest and most obvious are 
 
20 Bosswick, “Development of Asylum Policy in Germany,” 46. 
21 Bahar et al., “Migration and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 8.  
22 Ibid, 18.  
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outbreaks of primarily anti-immigrant violence within Germany. The eastern German towns of 
Hoyerswerda in 1991 and Rostock-Lichtenhagen in 1992 drew national attention when violent, 
anti-refugee riots broke out at the sites of refugee housing complexes.23 Despite local hostilities, 
the Königsteiner Schlüssel had directed these asylum seekers to these areas to live and work. 
This violence was then used by the media to characterize east Germans as Neo-Nazis that had 
not had the opportunity to reckon with their Nazi past due to the anti-fascist doctrine of their 
Soviet occupiers.24 Generally speaking, politicians and the media alike characterized this anti-
refugee violence in these eastern cities as inherent to the people of the region while similar 
incidents that most certainly did occur in the Bundesländer long a part of the Federal Republic 
were portrayed as isolated incidents.25 Still, politicians expressed sympathy for the rioters 
indicating that the tremendous job loss and economic uncertainty these cities faced sparked the 
discontent that led to the violence. This sympathy though was often lost with these comments 
being received by former citizens of the GDR as “patronizing commentary from West German 
politicians.”26  
 These events helped to shape changes in German asylum policy that would prove to be 
lasting. In 1991, the Bundestag passed the Aliens Act which entered into full effect in April 1993 
and helped to shorten the duration of asylum procedures to less than six weeks and mandated 
expulsion immediately upon a negative decision through the asylum procedure.27 A significant 
factor in why these measures were sought was due to the previously mentioned violence, and in a 
way, those choosing to be violent had won. By late 1992, a decision was reached to amend the 
 
23 Esther Adaire, “‘This Other Germany, the Dark One’: Post-Wall Memory Politics Surrounding the Neo-Nazi 
Riots in Rostock and Hoyerswerda,” German Politics & Society 37 (2019): 43, accessed January 15, 2021, 
doi:10.3167/gps.2019.370405. 
24 Ibid, 46. 
25 Ibid, 48. 
26 Ibid, 52. 
27 Bosswick, "Development of Asylum Policy in Germany," 48.  
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Grundgesetz to allow the expulsion of refugees back to their country of origin if it was deemed 
to be a safe third country.28 Free movement within Europe by refugees was also considered a 
concern for members of the European Community, and these concerns were addressed with 
provisions made in the Schengen II Agreement and the Dublin Regulation in 1992.29 As the 
1990’s continued on, the situation in the former Yugoslavia bettered, and in December 1995, the 
Dayton Peace Accords were signed.30 This official peace reached in the region began to prompt 
the assisted return of those living in Germany under Duldung status, as those merely tolerated 
had no legal right to remain in Germany once their country of origin was deemed by the German 
government as safe for return. Duldung was the status the overwhelming majority of refugees 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina held; it was estimated that 80% of those that could be considered 
war refugees under international law were merely granted Duldung status in Germany.31 By late 
1998, an estimated 250,000 of the 350,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina returned 
home voluntarily with the assistance of the German government.32  
 
Background of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis 
 In 2015, massive flows of migrants and asylum seekers began to seek refuge at Europe’s 
external coastlines and the media became flooded with disheartening images of people squeezed 
together on boats and horror stories of those that did not survive the journey. This European 
refugee crisis as it became known was the largest flow of refugees in the region since the end of 
World War II when there is believed to have been approximately forty million displaced persons 
 
28 Ibid, 50.  
29 Ibid, 54.  
30 Bahar et al., "Migration and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 7. 
31 Bosswick, "Development of Asylum Policy in Germany," 52.  
32 Ibid, 53.  
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and refugees within Europe.33 It was logical that in this particular crisis Germany would become 
the front runner in terms of taking the largest number of asylum seekers in Europe; this was the 
case in the early 1990’s with refugees from the former Yugoslavia. In 2014 at the very start of 
this “refugee crisis,” 219,000 migrants and asylum seekers crossed the Mediterranean to Europe, 
and since then, millions more have continued to cross the Mediterranean and other routes into 
Europe.34 The majority of these refugees came from Syria, which is still in 2020 the most 
common country of origin for refugees.35  
The conflict in Syria began in 2011 when the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad 
began to brutally crackdown on public demonstrations; this conflict soon escalated to a civil 
war.36 Conflict in Syria has continued for a decade and displaced millions of Syrians internally 
and externally, with the number of those affected hardly decreasing since the beginning of this 
conflict. The vast majority of Syrian displaced persons and refugees live in countries bordering 
Syria, making those that sought asylum in Europe in a sense outliers.37 By November 2015, the 
number of asylum seekers and migrants that sought refuge in Europe nearly quadrupled from the 
previous year; an estimated 800,000 migrants reached Europe’s external borders in 2015, most of 
these migrants arriving in Italy and Greece.38 The primary problem these asylum seekers faced 
on their journey to Europe was the lack of safe channels to travel through. Smugglers and unsafe 
conditions claimed the lives of thousands of asylum seekers as boats capsized and other 
conditions proved to be dangerous and deadly. At this time, it was also realized that the 
 
33Koren, “A Brief History of Europe’s Worst Refugee Crisis.” 
34 Ibid.  




38 Human Rights Watch, “Europe’s Refugee Crisis: How Should the US, EU, and OSCE Respond?” November 16, 
2015, accessed March 5, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action. 
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European Union’s asylum policy was not unified to the necessary level to handle the 
expansiveness of the situation. The process established by the Dublin Regulation placed undue 
burden on the first country of origin for processing, which led to external border countries, 
namely Italy and Greece, being wholly overwhelmed.39  
 At the height of the crisis, Angela Merkel stated the famous, or perhaps infamous, 
sentence “wir schaffen das” which roughly translates to “we can handle this” with regard to the 
flows of asylum seekers into the European Union and specifically into Germany.40 A few weeks 
later, Merkel welcomed into Germany thousands of asylum seekers that had been stranded in 
Budapest, and Germany became the first European country to temporarily suspend the Dublin 
Regulation which was interpreted as essentially opening the gates without restriction to asylum 
seekers primarily originating from the Middle East and North Africa, although this is not entirely 
the case. Asylum seeker cases were still processed in Germany and have been continuously since 
2015, although the peculiar case of the Duldung status still exists in Germany for those whose 
asylum applications have been rejected but are not required to leave Germany. In 2019, 
approximately 200,000 individuals with Duldung status were living in Germany in a sort of 
political limbo.41 Today, those with Duldung status are typically not allowed free movement, 
with only about 3 percent with this status able to move and work wherever they please within 
Germany. The specifics of the current situation of asylum seekers, those with Duldung status, as 
well as formally recognized refugees in Germany will be further analyzed in the remainder of 
this work.  
 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Economist, “Five Years after Arrival, Germany’s Refugees Are Integrating,” The Economist, August 25, 
2020, accessed 28 February 2021, https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/08/25/five-years-after-arrival-
germanys-refugees-are-integrating.  
41 Ibid.  
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Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 The questions I am aiming to answer through my research are the following: How has 
Germany been able and willing to respond to refugee crises since reunification? How has 
Germany achieved successful resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers since 2015?  
Both of these questions seek to create a detailed description of what refugee resettlement 
is like in Germany in 2021, six years following the 2015 European refugee crisis. This six-year 
gap places us in a unique position to be able to analyze longer-term outcomes of refugee 
resettlement, and by also examining relevant literature about the long-term outcomes seen with 
refugees from the former Yugoslavia, some predictions may be explored. 
I hypothesize that through effective aid networks, a pragmatic policy legacy and policy 
learning, Germany has been able to create a mostly effective system of resettlement for refugees 
and asylum seekers during the period of the last six years.   
 
Relevance of Questions 
 The world today has a record number of displaced persons and a continuously increasing 
number of refugees. It is important to have a comprehensive understanding of refugee 
resettlement in Germany today in order to see the best ways to help refugees in Germany and 
elsewhere. Germany has served as a major destination hub for asylum seekers, and as such, it can 
serve as a lab in which best practices can be analyzed and areas where progress may be made can 
be identified. These two extraordinary examples of 1992 and 2016 in post-reunification Germany 
serve as an excellent case study of what a resettlement state looks like under pressure. Both the 
example of the inflow of refugees from the former Yugoslavia and those primarily from Syria 
and other Middle Eastern and Northern African states were sudden and led to a high number of 
 Perkins 16 
asylum seeker applications in a short period of time. These two situations disrupted the standard 
flow of asylum seekers through the UN Refugee Agency and then to the respective German 
agencies on the Bundesland level, with this disruption leading to a crisis that necessitated 
immediate action. These programs drafted out of necessity may be evaluated for their 
effectiveness and success with their shortcomings being just as relevant when considering the 
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II. Literature Review 
Federalism in Germany 
Figure 1: German Governance Structure 
 
Source: UCI School of Social Sciences42 
Regional governance has a strong tradition in Germany, and today this regional 
governance is embodied in sixteen states, known in German as Bundesländer. These states make 
up the democratic, federal parliamentary republic that is modern Germany. The Grundgesetz 
gives significant power to the Bundesländer, however, in practice this power is not absolute. 
Most legislative power is assigned to the federal government (Bund) in the elected Bundestag 
and the state-appointed Bundesrat. The states are then given most administrative responsibility, 
with issues requiring national coordination like immigration and foreign trade plus national 
 
42 Russel J. Dalton, “Politics in Germany: Chapter 2,” Uci.edu, 2010, 
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~rdalton/germany/ch2/chap2.htm. 
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defense being legislated on the federal level and then implemented on the level of the 
Bundesland.43 Laws concerning refugees are considered a concurrent power meaning both the 
federal level and the state level have authority, although the federal level is given precedence if a 
dispute arises. The Königsteiner Schlüssel, shown below in Table 1, is the quota system that 
determines the distribution of asylum seekers and respects this issue as a concurrent power by 
giving the Bundesländer the administrative responsibility of distributing aid to asylum seekers.  
Table 1: Königstein Quota (2019) 








Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 1.98 
Lower Saxony 9.41 







Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge44 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, “Initial Distribution of Asylum Seekers (EASY),” November 28, 2018, 
accessed February 15, 2021, https://www.bamf.de/EN/Themen/AsylFluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsylverfahrens 
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Federalism in Germany presents irregularities in the legal framework for asylum seekers, 
as on varying levels these asylum seekers face different legislation, and funding delays between 
the federal government and local communities have the possibility of creating problems for 
asylum seekers, refugees, and their supporters. Federal diversity, meaning differences between 
the implementation of asylum policy on the level of each individual Bundesland, accounts for a 
wide spectrum of realities in asylum policy ranging from “permissive” to “restrictive” realities in 
each Bundesland. This dichotomy comes from welfare state research which tends to focus on the 
generosity of specific programs and initiatives in evaluating their outcomes.45 In Germany since 
1992, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
or BAMF) has run 42 branch offices which are responsible for carrying out asylum procedures 
outlined in the 1993 Asylum Act (Asylgesetz).46 The Bundesländer then are tasked with carrying 
out the 1993 Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) which generally 
outlines the aid network that each Bundesland is responsible for providing with most federal 
states shifting this responsibility to the more local level of individual municipalities.47  
Töller and Reiter analyzed these instances of federal diversity in asylum policy by 
determining the specifics of housing centralization, the availability of health insurance cards, and 
asylum seeker recognition rate for each Bundesland by creating tables showing the wide variety 
of outcomes that an asylum seeker may face depending on the state he or she is allocated to 
based upon the Königstein Quota system. Decentralized housing is utilized the highest in 
Schleswig-Holstein at 90.6 percent compared to the lowest utilization at 29.5 percent in 
 
/Erstverteilung/erstverteilung-node.html. 
45 Annette Elisabeth Töller and Renate Reiter, 2019, “Federal Diversity of Asylum Policies in  
Germany What Can We Learn From ‘Immigration Federalism’?” 7, accessed March 27, 2021, 
https://www.ippapublicpolicy.org/file/paper/5cfeb1a1779c8.pdf. 
46 Ibid, 5.  
47 Ibid, 5. 
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Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.48 An issue surprisingly left to the individual Bundesländer is 
the ability to decide whether or not a country is safe for deportations to occur to from Germany. 
This is illustrated in the example given of deportations to Afghanistan. Seven of the sixteen 
Bundesländer in 2017 did not carry out deportations to Afghanistan noting continued concerns 
for safety, while the other nine did carry out deportations to Afghanistan.49 These differences 
between implementation of asylum policy on the level of the states is especially relevant 
considering the Königsteiner Schlüssel quota system does not allow asylum seekers to choose 
their Bundesland of residence, leaving the outcome of their housing and even repatriation 
decisions in the hands of a particular state government. These issues in diverse application of 
asylum policy are not believed to be merely based in partisan politics but instead indicative of 
regional realities; local issues like unemployment and occurrences of xenophobic attacks affect 
regional decisions as to how to implement policy.50 
 
Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia – An Enduring Example 
 The example of refugees from the former Yugoslavia has many implications for research 
regarding refugees in Germany today. With these events now being nearly thirty years in the 
past, some modern research has looked back at the outcomes of refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia, both those that returned to their country of origin and those that remained in 
Germany or another resettlement country. Some studies from the 1990’s look at the immediate 
realities and outcomes for Yugoslavian refugees, and this is what is most comparable to 
understanding what we see today as we are only a few years out from the onset of the most 
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recent large flow of refugees into Germany. Other studies specifically look at the long-term 
outcomes, and these are most telling as to what we may expect when eventually it becomes safe 
for those living with Duldung status to return to their countries of origin.  
 
Policy Legacies and the Role of the Media in the 1990’s 
 History plays a significant role in policy preferences and perceptions. While looking at 
policy legacy in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, the most obvious predecessor is the influx 
of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. This Yugoslavian refugee crisis too 
had its predecessor, but in a seemingly unlikely place. Starting in 1955 with an agreement 
between the German and Italian governments, Germany’s booming economy began the import of 
additional workers, which were known as Gastarbeiter (guest workers).51 These workers were 
intended at the onset of this program to be temporary and return within a relatively short period 
of time, typically two years. This, however, was not the case, and many Gastarbeiter did not 
return to their countries of origin and instead stayed in Germany which had previously not been 
considered a country of immigration. According to Ellerman, this reality of “guest workers” 
becoming long-time residents would influence political decisions in subsequent decades and 
cause conservative politicians to adopt a “no-immigration paradigm” with regard to worker 
recruitment in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Ellerman specifically focuses on policy learning in 
Germany with Gastarbeiter and the later manifestations of this program, stating that later 
political decisions were designed in preventing the settlement of such workers. Although 
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Ellerman’s research does not discuss policy learning with asylum seekers, this framework can be 
used to look at the historical progression of asylum policy in Germany between 1991 and 2021.  
 In 1995, Brosius and Eps looked at media coverage of attacks on refugees in Germany. 
They draw their analysis around four highly violent attacks which had occurred against refugees 
and immigrants in Germany in the early 1990’s, specifically studying print news sources 
including “a tabloid (Bild-Zeitung), a weekly news magazine (Der Spiegel), the major German 
news agency (Deutsch Presse Agentur, dpa) and two national newspapers (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung).”52 These four major events included attacks 
specifically against asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda and Rostock-Lichtenhagen as well as attacks 
on non-asylum seeking Turkish families in Mölln and Solingen. Brosius and Eps found that after 
each of these major events, it was more likely for these news sources to cover events with similar 
attributes. This coverage is noted to be “simultaneously undistorted and distorted—undistorted in 
reporting the events in question in an unbiased manner, and distorted in that only certain events 
are covered.”53 These findings suggest that the media has a significant role in how individuals 
and politicians may perceive asylum seekers, as inherent biases and framing play a role in what 
is covered. However, this study was limited to only looking at the news sources themselves 
meaning the effects of this coverage on public opinion as well as policy cannot be determined 
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Psychological Scars in War Refugees from the Former Yugoslavia 
 When considering the barriers that refugees face, it is vital to consider the psychological 
ones. Many asylum seekers and refugees arrive after having experienced extreme trauma, and 
with that, there is a necessity to support treatment for those in need. Schwarz-Langer et al. 
discuss this with their case study involving thirteen civil war refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia which were in treatment at the Psychiatric Ambulatory Clinic of the University of 
Ulm.54 These thirteen individuals ranged in age from 26 to 50, were both male and female, and 
also differed in their specific diagnoses and traumatic experiences. To best conduct treatment, it 
was important for the mental health professionals to utilize professional and experienced 
interpreters with the same ethnic background as the patient in order to best communicate, in the 
event a translator was necessary.55 The most relevant finding from this study lies in the effect of 
the political limbo on the asylum seekers with uncertain statuses. Following the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accords, asylum law in Germany changed to become more restrictive forcing 
some asylum seekers to return or face forcible deportation. During this period from 1996 to 
1998, all thirteen patients in the study had worsening symptoms despite earlier process as they 
feared being forced to return to their countries of origin where they had experienced trauma just 
a few years prior.56 In another study, Luebben worked alongside traumatized Bosnian survivors 
of civil war in the former Yugoslavia living in Frankfurt in order to both document testimony 
and understand the current situation these refugees were facing.57 In this group as well, the 
political uncertainty faced by these individuals greatly hindered their recovery. 
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This political limbo hindered the road to recovery for many traumatized patients. The 
mental health professionals involved in these studies recommended additional political 
protection and security, specifically for those extremely traumatized war refugees, as a 
combination of security in the country of exile and pharmaceutical and psychotherapeutic 
treatments proved to have the best outcomes in recovery. These findings have further 
implications, as those traumatized need both access to mental health support through their 
support networks and policy that favors protection. These findings are certainly applicable when 
considering refugees today as well, especially considering there is typically no certainty in a 
timeframe of a safe return to a refugee’s country of origin.  
 
Successful Support from the Perspective of Refugees 
 Many studies broadly look at refugees, but few specifically focus on the opinion of 
refugees about their own experiences in their host countries. Zepinic addressed the issue of 
varying types of support that states provide by directly interviewing refugees in Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy.58 The interviewees were required to be refugees and born in 
Yugoslavia, and interviews were conducted with each interviewee to determine the use of 
specific types of support services in various areas including primary health, mental health, 
accommodations, employment, social, financial/material, and legal. Nearly all refugees had 
received some type of support, with all in Germany having had access to support in at least one 
of the given areas. Access to mental health support was available to 64.6 percent of refugees in 
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Germany, but those in the United Kingdom and Italy did not have nearly as much access. Of 
refugees in the UK, 36.7 percent had access to mental health support and only 12.8 percent of 
those in Italy had access to this type of support. This wide variation in access between 
resettlement countries shows a clear problem, as it is unlikely that those refugees in the UK or 
Italy are any less traumatized or in less need of mental healthcare than those in Germany.  
 Furthermore, this study explored the helpfulness of the support services utilized by 
refugees as well as areas in which more assistance on the part of the government would be 
appreciated. In Germany, the accommodations support proved to be detrimental to the mental 
health and wellbeing of refugees according to the response of 29.9 percent that received this 
particular resource compared to 2 percent of those in the UK and 1.3 percent in Italy. As this 
study was conducted with interviews, the interviewer was able to gather additional information 
as to why such a high percentage of refugees in Germany found this support to be detrimental. 
The issue laid at the very onset of their move to Germany at the initial reception centers, 
commonly referred to by interviewees as “the camp.”59 Some interviewees even went as far as to 
stay that conditions in the initial reception centers in Germany were worse than their life in 
concentration camps in the former Yugoslavia. This study also found that refugees currently 
residing in Germany wanted additional access to education and training as well as more 
assistance in finding employment. This study seeks to gain insights from an often-ignored 
community, the refugees themselves. While the past cannot be changed, future policy and 
implementation can take into consideration the concerns and input provided from refugees about 
their own experiences.  
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Defining Successful Refugee Resettlement Internationally 
 The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe brought attention to refugee resettlement on a global 
scale. The ultimate goal of organizations like the United Nations and the international 
community is for the conflicts that create refugees to no longer exist. This would allow for the 
voluntary repatriation of asylum seekers and refugees from their countries of resettlement to their 
home countries. In our world today where total peace is not possible, it is important to look to 
what else may be considered “success” in these varying contexts. It must be noted refugee 
resettlement is in itself a particular process, with the resettlement aspect being a conscious effort 
on the part of the safe third country and partnering organizations. The UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) states refugee resettlement has three primary functions, with this process serving as a 
“protection tool” to meet the needs of refugees that cannot be otherwise met, a “long term 
solution,” as well as a “responsibility sharing mechanism.”60 In an ideal situation, it is the 
responsibility of UNHCR to identify the global needs of displaced persons, establish protection 
criteria delineating refugees which will most benefit from resettlement, and conducting an 
assessment through their offices before then referring the case to a resettlement state for further 
processing. Each year, the United Nations hosts the Annual Tripartite Consultations on 
Resettlement (ATCR) which is used to create “collaborative efforts between UNHCR, 
governments, NGOs, refugees and other stakeholders” where current efforts are evaluated and 
suggestions for improvements are discussed.61 Due to the urgency of the 2015 refugee crisis in 
Europe, this process needed to be expedited and at times overlooked as asylum seekers arrived at 
Europe’s coastlines, which makes this case in particular extraordinary. Regardless of the 
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particular channel in which refugees and asylum seekers arrive in their communities, integration 
is still the ultimate goal. 
 The individual states are responsible for providing reception and integration support for 
incoming refugees, but how this looks in terms of organizations involved and what exactly 
integration means ultimately differs depending on the state of reception. Typically, this process 
involves the interconnected duties and responsibilities of the resettlement state, NGOs, 
communities, volunteers, and the refugees themselves. Integration can take many forms, but the 
main categories for integration support are legal, economic, and social-cultural.62 Integration 
should not, according to UNHCR, be only assimilation, as this does not address the needs of 
those being resettled. Current outcomes frameworks used by resettlement states and service 
providers are vital in understanding what these providers consider to be the definition of 
“success,” with this definition potentially being different depending on if service providers, 
experts, or refugees are being consulted.63 In order to better understand these outcome 
frameworks, Deloitte New Zealand consulted ten service providers throughout Australia, North 
America, and Europe to specifically look at what their measured outcomes were; from this, eight 
distinct outcomes frameworks were distinguished.64 Of the outcomes measured by the 
framework, only underemployment and security were adequately measured and without gaps. 
All others were found to be lacking in terms of actual measurement capabilities, with severe 
measurement gaps identified in frequently used measures like social capital, capturing refugee 
voice in measurement, identity, and refugee independence. Even in infrequently used 
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measurements, severe measurement gaps were identified in refugee voices in outcomes 
framework, power and control, ability to give back, and in happiness and fulfillment.  
 Certainly, a major reason behind these measurement gaps is the “intangibility” of many 
outcomes, yet these “intangible” outcomes are nonetheless still vital in assessing integration 
efforts. Outcomes can often be abstract, and funding and time constraints severely limit the 
ability of service providers to even begin to attempt to measure such outcomes. This hindrance 
prevents successful measurement of integration, and furthermore risks the repetition of past 
mistakes and a lack of meeting the needs of individual asylum seekers and refugees. These 
“intangible” outcomes also often go unmeasured due to the lack of a solid and agreed upon 
international definition of integration. What exactly constitutes integration is a highly debated 
and contentious topic in itself. Individual resettlement states, and even sometimes individual 
service providers, largely have the option of deciding upon their own definition of integration 
and furthermore their own desired outcomes.65 We can see these differing definitions on the level 
of individual states. Sweden and the Netherlands, for example, define integration as assimilation 
with a best-case scenario being for a refugee to be remarkably similar in attitudes and values to a 
Swede or a Dutchman, while the United Kingdom tends to view successful integration as the 
refugee functioning well in their new country. These perceptions of what integration should look 
like thus determines policy and desired outcomes. 
 Unfortunately, what integration “should” be like is often heavily influenced by political 
opinions as opposed to the realities experienced by asylum seekers and refugees. Policies 
regarding resettlement often “favour the current government’s agenda and the needs of its voters, 
rather than those of the refugees.”66 This distanced approach oftentimes ignores the reality of the 
 
65 Ibid, 8.  
66 Ibid, 9.  
 Perkins 29 
experiences of service providers and refugees, which are valuable perspectives that ensure a 
holistic understanding of the issues refugee communities face. Furthermore, the reality of many 
resettlement programs in existence today is the fact these programs were drafted hastily in the 
wake of the 2015 refugee crisis. Out of necessity to quickly create support networks and 
programs for refugees and asylum seekers, the programs often only record “outcomes and needs 
that are visible and tangible, such as housing and employment.”67 This current structure ignores 
the necessity for broader holistic approaches that serve to understand the issues asylum seekers 
face outside of easily measurable outcomes.  
 
German Definition of Successful Refugee Resettlement  
 German and European integration often uses the principle of Leitkultur (leading or 
guiding culture) as the basis for integration policies.68 This term originated in academic circles in 
the late 1990’s and at first was not a highly politicized term or even expected to be considered 
uniquely German. The concept underlying Leitkultur is the idea of what is essentially a 
supremacy of European, liberal, and often secular values being the guiding culture behind 
policies on integration of migrants into Germany and Europe as a whole. Migrants are expected 
to embrace German political ideals, language, and culture. This represented a shift away from the 
previous ideology emphasizing a multicultural and separate approach towards a focus on 
integration at the turn of the new millennium. Of course, Leitkultur is not spared from the 
politicization issues regarding migrants attract. More recently the populist Alternative für 
Deutschland party has made Leitkultur and its interpretations divisive, thus causing the needs of 
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asylum seekers and refugees at times to be ignored for political gains.69 Still, Leitkultur in 
Germany prevails as the dominant model used in creating assistance for asylum seekers and 
refugees with integration being the key takeaway from this model.  
 Integration in Germany is a federally managed and formal process that primarily focuses 
on Integrationskurse (integration courses) administered by local BAMF offices and community 
organizations. On the landing page of the BAMF website on integration courses, it explicitly 
states, “if you would like to live in Germany, you should learn German.”70 Clearly, learning the 
German language is considered a vital part of integration in Germany, and this language learning 
is facilitated through these courses which will be further explored later on in the analysis of 
support networks, as these integration courses are a part of the support network available in 
Germany to asylum seekers and refugees. German language learning is strongly emphasized in 
Germany, as knowledge of the German language “is important if you are looking for work, if 
you need to complete application forms, if you would like to support your children in school or if 
you would like to meet new people.”71 Here language is shown to be considered important to 
facilitate better employment opportunities, potentially better outcomes in housing or legal issues, 
education for family members, and social interactions. Although brief and a mere introduction to 
the integration courses, BAMF quickly highlights its main point—learning German is essential 
to integration and successful resettlement. Language instruction combined with additional 
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III. Methodology 
In order to examine and explain the current nature of refugee resettlement in Germany, I 
gathered and analyzed a variety of secondary sources dating primarily from 2014 to the present. 
These sources include journal articles, news articles, as well as official government reports. The 
majority of the resources used are in English with a few documents and articles utilized being 
written in German. I am specifically focusing on Germany as a whole for this case study, as the 
specifics of individual Bundesländer are not universal and would need to be studied on a city-by-
city or community-by-community level in order to create a quality comparative study. From 
these sources, I will be drawing inferences with regard to the current state of refugee resettlement 
in Germany. This study is qualitative in nature, and as such, data will not be utilized aside from 
mentioning relevant statistics briefly.  
 I will specifically be exploring the points of support networks and policy legacy in 
regards to refugee resettlement today. Support networks include support from the federal, state, 
and local level and range from financial to psychological support, and for these support 
networks, I will specifically look at housing, integration courses, and advice centers. Using the 
framework of policy learning and legacy, I will look broadly at changes in asylum policy 
between the first peak in asylum seeker applications in 1992 to the second peak in 2016 as well 
as changes up until the present in response to this extreme stress placed upon these policies and 
systems. More specifically I will look at the city of Soest in North Rhine-Westphalia. This city 
has published an evaluation of its own integration efforts, and this document serves as a basis of 
understanding an individual small city’s perception of itself and its own positioning in the 
grander scheme of asylum policy in Germany.  
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Limitations 
 It is important to note that while this study attempts to explore as in depth as possible the 
historical policy legacy of refugee resettlement as well as the current reality of aid and support 
networks in Germany, limitations still naturally exist. Both of these topics are extremely vast and 
could be approached in very different ways. To narrow this down, I sought to answer my primary 
research question, “How has Germany achieved successful resettlement of refugees and asylum 
seekers since 2015?” Given the massive scale of the number of asylum seeker applications 
Germany reviewed and the fact many asylum seekers are living decent lives in Germany today, 
Germany was for the most part successful especially given the extreme circumstances and need 
for immediate action in the 2015 refugee crisis. The focus of this study is not to examine 
everything Germany has done wrong in the resettlement of refugees and asylum seekers since 
2015, as this study instead focuses on what measures Germany has used to achieve successful 
resettlement.  
This question, with a particular emphasis on “how,” has led me to approach the study as a 
general overview of the materials at hand. The resources I had available were limited due to the 
nature of this study. While many resources exist in English and I have advanced proficiency of 
the German language, the amount of published materials and previously conducted research 
available exclusively in German was immense. If I had access to a German library and/or 
database, I would have likely been able to find even more resources. When possible, I did utilize 
the available German language sources, and I tried to ensure the gaps in the research I will later 
identify have not been previously filled by research in German.  
 The largest limitation of this study was the interruption of my originally planned 
research. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I was unable to study abroad at the University of 
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Trier in Germany in Spring 2020 where I had planned to more specifically focus on the available 
support and aid networks that asylum seekers and refugees have access to in a small town where 
there is not a significant population of those with a migrant background. Since I did not have the 
same access to this information, I changed my focus by surveying a wider source of resources 
and focusing on Germany as a whole as opposed to only one city or region which allowed me to 
gain deeper insights into the various changes in asylum seeker and refugee policies in Germany 
over the last thirty years. This research has the potential for me to further build upon if later I am 
able to go to Germany, and in having a better understanding of these policies, I am better 
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IV. Findings and Discussion 
Historical Policy Legacy and Recent Policy Change 
 The development of German asylum policy dates back to the 1948 Grundgesetz, which 
guarantees the right to seek asylum in Germany, with Article 16a of the Grundgesetz asserting 
“persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum.”72 Later policies 
regarding the Gastarbeiter program in 1950’s Germany would prove to have lasting effects on 
German migration policy. Generally migrants in Germany became to be known as “temporary 
guests” which would at a given time in the future return to their home country.73 In 1973, the 
Gastarbeiter program was halted in the face of global economic crisis, with this also signaling in 
Germany a period of restrictive immigration policy.74 Policy and implementation during the 
1970’s and 1980’s focused on “asylum deterrence,” with the goal of making permanence 
unattractive for potential migrants and preventing integration.75 While these restrictive policies 
specifically dealt with migration for economic reasons, restrictions on foreign laborers meant 
policy spillover into asylum policy.  
In 1992, Germany received a record number of asylum seeker applications from people 
fleeing civil war in the former Yugoslavia.76 At the same time, conservative rhetoric 
characterized many asylum seekers as “abusing the system.”77 This shock to the German political 
system caused by the massive increase in asylum applications served to cause Germany to 
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further establish itself as a “self-declared non-immigrant country” that granted only temporary 
assistance to those hundreds of thousands of Yugoslavian refugees that flooded into Germany 
during the first half of the 1990’s.78 At the same time, the need to further codify German policies 
on asylum seeking arose. In 1993, both the Asylum Act (Asylgesetz) and the Asylum Seekers 
Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz) were introduced into German law.79 These acts were 
supplemental to what was already outlined in regard to asylum law in the German Constitution 
that guaranteed asylum to those facing political persecution. The Asylum Act is still highly 
relevant today when looking at policies on asylum seekers, as this is the law which “codifies the 
process and consequences of granting and denying asylum.”80 This same time period saw the 
founding of some forty-two regional branch offices of the earlier established Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (BAMF) which is charged with the responsibility of conducting asylum 
procedures and processing applications in accordance with the Asylum Act; this BAMF branch 
office system is still used today to process asylum seeker applications.81 BAMF offices and the 
Asylum Act are unique in that they are not assigned to the individual Bundesländer for 
implementation and are instead simply extensions of the federal government. The Asylum 
Seekers Benefits Act is more decentralized. This act places the responsibility of the distribution 
of benefits to asylum seekers for their first fifteen months of their stay in Germany on the level 
of the individual Bundesland which typically then further delegates this responsibility to local 
municipalities.82  
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 Starting in the early 2000’s, these policies began to adapt and change as Germany starts 
to stray away from its previous conception as a “non-immigrant country.” This change was 
spurred by the 1998 formation of the Social-Democratic/Green coalition and the election of 
Gerhard Schröder as Chancellor. Schröder emphasized the need for labor migration to fill the 
expected lack of necessary laborers to keep the German economy fully functioning as Germany 
began to reckon with its aging workforce.83 Still, despite the start of more liberal policies and 
beliefs on migration, there is a major drop in asylum applications in Germany following 1992, 
making these more lenient policies put into place during a time when a migration crisis was not 
imminent. These policy shifts started in general migration policy, with laws making it possible 
for children born in Germany to migrant parents to gain citizenship.84 Gradually, the restrictive 
policies and practices established around 1992 were lifted through a series of changes to the 
existing laws applying to asylum seekers, refugees, and more broadly migrants in general. In 
2005, the same year Chancellor Angela Merkel began her first term, the Residence Act 
(Aufenthaltsgesetz) went into effect, fundamentally simplifying the bureaucracy of conditions for 
residence for all foreigners in Germany.85 This 2005 act “provides rules concerning the entry, 
stay, exit, and employment of foreigners in general.”86 Ultimately the Residence Act served to 
simplify administrative complexity by changing residence permits to either be temporary or for 
permanent residence.87 Notably, Chancellor Merkel and the more conservative Christian-
Democratic Union (CDU) party’s election win did not signal a reversion to previously restrictive 
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policies. On the contrary, under Merkel and the CDU leadership migration and asylum policy 
continued to advance as Germany became a more liberal immigration country. 
This was not an entirely German and unprompted revision of laws as the European Union 
began to issue directives aimed at liberalizing and easing restrictions on migrants and asylum 
seekers. The 2004 EU Qualifications Directive and later the 2011 EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive directly impacted changes in German immigration law. The most notable feature of 
these EU Directives was the requirement for those given refugee status under the Geneva 
Convention to be entitled to the “same rights as those with asylum under national law.”88 It 
should be noted this provision does not require the same legal status for those granted asylum by 
the German national government and those considered refugees by the United Nations only that 
these two groups have the same legal rights and freedoms in the host country.  
The paradigm of Germany as a “non-immigrant country” began to shift to allow the 
consideration of migrants as an important part of Germany from the implementation of the 2005 
Residence Act onwards. Integration efforts for migrants began officially with the introduction of 
integration courses, and multiculturalism as a doctrine for separation of migrants from Germans 
began to disappear as BAMF began to emphasize integration as a long-term process in which 
migrants should learn the German language and accept the basic values of the country.89 Again, 
in 2009, the Report on Integration Indicators (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, 
Flüchtlinge, und Integration) began to systematically monitor certain statistics about newcomers 
in Germany; this was a part of the larger plan and policies that served to identify best practices 
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and plans for understanding and integrating migrants.90 At this time, individual municipalities 
and states began to create municipal action plans regarding how to handle integration and 
support efforts of migrants broadly. These efforts were not specifically focused on asylum 
seekers and refugees. Trends during this time of asylum seeker applications were fairly 
consistent making asylum policy not an area of particular concern. This would change radically 
as 2014 saw the start of a rise in the number of asylum applications. 
The first change made in terms of policy as the increase in asylum applications was 
noticed was the reduction of a wait time for a work permit; this wait time was decreased from 
twelve months to three months for most eligible individuals.91 This allowed for the possibility of 
asylum seekers to get to work quicker and begin progress towards independence. In order to 
attempt to decrease the number of asylum seekers being physically within the country, so-called 
“safe countries of origin” were established. In 2014, Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were added to this list, and in 2015, the list was further expanded to include 
Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro.92 With a growing number of asylums seeker applications and 
reception facilities being overwhelmed, this policy served to encourage those from the “safe 
countries of origin” to remain in their home country while their application was being processed, 
as if they were to physically move to Germany they would be ineligible for a work permit and 
would be required to stay in the reception center until their application had been fully processed. 
This system served to act as a deterrent to those not believed to be in immediate need. Much of 
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asylum policy during the crisis existed to lessen the burden on support systems and decrease the 
processing time for applications.  
Similar decisions to achieve better efficiency in the face of extreme strain on the asylum 
application processing system included the perhaps infamous decision made by Chancellor 
Merkel in 2015 to halt the Dublin Regulation. In reality, this halt was selective and short-lived; 
in Germany, the Dublin Regulation, which dictates that asylum seeker applications should be 
processed in the country the individual seeking asylum first arrived, was only halted from 
August to October 2015 and only for Syrian applicants.93 Also for efficiency, the Cluster 
Procedure system was established between 2015 and 2017 to handle this large surge in asylum 
seeker applications, with four separate clusters being established and countries of origin being 
assigned to each individual cluster. Cluster A was for individuals that due to their country of 
origin had a high change of receiving protection, while Cluster B was for those that were less 
likely to receive protection; Cluster C was then filled with complex cases and D with cases that 
fall under the Dublin Regulation.94 This Cluster System, which offered advantages mostly only 
for those in Cluster A, also determined whether or not early access to Integrationskurse through 
BAMF was allowed, with this privilege being offered to most in the first cluster. Others from 
countries like Afghanistan (Cluster B) faced lengthy waiting times for application processing and 
were simultaneously denied access to certain resources like these integration courses, thus 
making social and economic integration a more difficult and lengthy process for such 
individuals. 
The 2016 Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz) was passed federally to provide further 
guidance and support on integration measures, serving as an important step in showing Germany 
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as a country willing and able to assist in refugee resettlement. This act serves as a long-term 
commitment for asylum seekers and refugees to have the opportunity to stay in Germany by 
being provided tools to assist in successful resettlement. It also solidified the restrictions placed 
on those from countries deemed to be safe countries of origin; no longer could someone from 
one of these countries receive labor market access until their case has been processed and 
approved.95 The Integration Act served to update efforts through the conception of “support and 
challenge.”96 In terms of support, more opportunities in the form of integration courses are to be 
provided to those that are likely to receive protected status or those which have already been 
granted this status. Changes were also made to ensure legal certainty for those with tolerated 
status, provided they are enrolled in vocational training. Residence rules were additionally 
strengthened to prevent overcrowding in cities, thus reinforcing the Königstein Quota system. 
The Integration Act was not simply to increase benefits for asylum seekers and those with 
tolerated status; on the contrary, the act serves to “challenge” these individuals with certain 
responsibilities.97 If an asylum seeker chooses not to enroll in required integration courses, he or 
she may have their benefits curtailed, and participation in these courses and the labor market is 
required to prove integration and receive permission for permanent residency and settlement. 
German migration and asylum policy has faced challenges and changes over the years, 
and in recent years’ asylum policy has proven to be very adaptable to the situation at hand 
although at times hindered by administrative and political lag. The German government was able 
to solve its own problem of an aging workforce and a need for more laborers by solving the 
 
95 Ibid, 22.  
96 Bundesregierung, “Integration Act to Support and Challenge,” Bundesregierung.de, July 8,  
2016, accessed March 20, 2021, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/integration-act-to-support-and-
challenge-411626. 
97 Ibid. 
 Perkins 41 
“refugee problem” with millions unable to return home due to conflict in their home countries 
finding a new home in Germany. Still, it should be noted that these policies by no means made 
Germany a country with fully open borders that accepted all who applied for asylum. The 
complex, legal quagmire still continues for many, although the 2016 Integration Act has lessened 
the burden on individuals willing to attend vocational training by providing them a more solid 
legal pathway. This adaptability and flexibility has allowed Germany to handle the massive surge 
of asylum seekers from 2015 onwards with remarkable success, although anecdotal evidence 
from individuals still shows that this success is not absolute. In order to see what these policies 
look like in practice, especially with regard to integration, it is essential to understand the 
networks of support created from these policies.   
 
Aid and Support Networks 
Aid and support networks exist in Germany both formally and informally and on the 
federal, state, and municipal levels. Prior to the 2005 Residence Act, integration was viewed as 
being largely something left to welfare and civil society organizations as opposed to being a 
political issue.98 The federal government’s role pre-2005 was simply to finance the lives of 
asylum seekers but not facilitate any unified approach to integration. Between 1992 and 1993, 
the federal government reached a so-called “asylum compromise” in the wake of the influx of 
asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia, with this producing the Asylum Seekers Benefits 
Act which dictates the available aid for asylum seekers.99 The act created a separate social 
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security system for asylum seekers and certain foreign nationals with lower benefits in 
comparison to the similar safety nets available for German citizens. In 2012, this act was 
revisited to determine the constitutionality of cash versus in-kind benefits under the act; this 
ruling determined the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act was not constitutional as it did not provide 
an acceptable minimum level of financial support needed for those eligible for benefits.100 In-
kind benefits and cash benefits were ruled to both be still allowed, and the subsequent 2015 Act 
on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures would further affect the federal benefits available to 
asylum seekers. This act sped up the asylum process in addition to changing the system of 
financial support for asylum seekers. Federally, in more cases in-kind benefits replaced cash 
benefits, and Asylum Package II passed shortly after decreased asylum seekers’ monthly cash 
benefits.101 Asylum Package II distinguished between asylum seekers living in reception centers 
and those not. Prior to this passage, a single adult living in a reception center could have 
expected to receive €140 per month. After this passage, this same adult would receive no 
monthly cash benefits and instead receive only in-kind benefits. Those living outside of reception 
centers still received a monthly cash benefit, although the amount was decreased and was to be 
supplemented by in-kind benefits.102 
The Asylum Seekers Benefits Act grants the task of reception, accommodations, and the 
granting of social benefits to the state and then the municipality (Kommunen), with the asylum 
seeker receiving basic services (Grundleistungen) for the first fifteen months and then after this 
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time period analog services (Analogleistungen).103 This leaves individual municipalities as 
opposed to states as ultimately responsible for handling the specifics of their aid and support 
networks on a more local level. One particular example is the small city of Soest in North Rhine-
Westphalia, Germany. Soest is a relatively small city with just under 50,000 inhabitants as of 
2019, and an estimated non-German population of approximately 10%.104 In 2019, the city 
published a “Municipal Action Plan for the Integration of Refugees in Soest” outlining the 
historical overview of the situation with asylum seekers in Germany as well as how the city in 
particular was able to respond to the 2015 refugee crisis. The city outlines six building blocks 
necessary for the continuation of the integration of asylum seekers and refugees, including 
German language instruction, day care and school, vocational colleges, profession and 
qualifications, private apartments, as well as religion and free time.105 The interest in and 
planning of this document seems to be unique and a project only undertaken by the cities with 
the most serious commitment to successfully resettling refugees, making Soest likely an 
outstanding example in its commitment to learn and improve from past mistakes in regard to 
asylum seekers and refugees. The city even goes as far to state that the process of integration is a 
joint effort between migrants and the host society. Using this framework of successful 
integration outlined by the city of Soest, the particular topics of housing support and German 
language instruction will be explored. These other aspects, however, will be left aside here due to 
the methodological problem in measuring outcomes in these areas outlined above. Housing and 
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language instruction serve as a start at understanding the interconnectedness of the federal, state, 
and municipal levels of support for asylum seekers in Germany. 
 
Housing Support 
 Assistance for asylum seekers starts with accommodations.106 A newly arrived asylum 
seeker is in immediate need of shelter, with this basic necessity being one of the first priorities of 
the Bundesland and its various organizations to secure. At first, housing is primarily federally 
funded and under normal circumstances will take place at a reception center. Each Bundesland 
has at least one reception center with some Bundesländer having a special “anchor center” where 
the reception center and other processes for asylum seekers all are to take place at one central 
location. Length of stay for an asylum seeker at a reception center can vary widely depending on 
a number of factors, with this stay lasting up to eighteen months, especially if the asylum seeker 
originates from a country deemed a safe country of origin. At the start of the 2015 crisis, these 
initial reception centers found themselves pushed to capacity and unable to handle the inflow of 
asylum seekers needing accommodations, thus creating a need for several emergency shelters to 
be set up in various locations throughout the country between 2015 and 2016. In Soest, 
temporary accommodations were established at a school, the Conrad-von-Soest Gymnasium and 
then later moved to the Kanaal-van-Wessem barracks in order to create a higher capacity.107 The 
Soest report does not evaluate the success of these measures directly, so it is not known what the 
conditions were like in these temporary, emergency accommodation centers, but in many cases 
the conditions in temporary accommodations was reported to be dismal. In Berlin, the former 
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Tempelhof airport was converted into emergency housing at the height of the 2015 crisis.108 
Conditions at Tempelhof were not satisfactory, with some watchdog organizations even going as 
far as to call the conditions there inhumane.109 
 In considering the desired housing situation for asylum seekers, the ultimate goal is 
typically defined as decentralization and independence. The city of Soest defines a three-phase 
model of housing as one of their building blocks to successful integration with the last phase of 
this plan being independent living accommodations.110 The first phase is the necessary initial 
reception center which all asylum seekers pass through to have their immediate need for shelter 
met. Then, the second phase is defined as a move away from this ultra-centralized housing in 
accommodation centers towards residential units where asylum seekers still live in close 
proximity to one another but have a greater amount of autonomy and independence. In some 
Bundesländer, this move to phase two is not as authentic as may be desired in moving through 
this framework; these phase two “collective accommodations” are sometimes in the same 
building as the initial reception center, especially in areas like Bavaria which favor the use of 
“anchor centers” as a one-stop for all matters dealing with asylum cases.111 Regardless of these 
intermediary housing stage, the third phase of housing for asylum seekers is private 
accommodations.112 These private accommodations are considered to be independent and 
decentralized and provide a great deal of autonomy for asylum seekers, and with Asylum 
Package II, moving to decentralized accommodations means the start of receiving a monthly 
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stipend. However, private housing is not universally the norm for asylum seekers in differing 
Bundesländer, as illustrated in Table 2. 






























 This table presents the rate of decentralized housing in percentage by Bundesland. These 
rates vary from as low as 29.5 percent in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to as high as 90.6 
percent in Schleswig-Holstein. North Rhine-Westphalia, the Bundesland where Soest lies, is 
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relatively low in terms of achieving decentralized housing at only 39.4 percent. The point at 
which an asylum seeker is in the application process can affect whether or not decentralized 
housing is yet an option. Additionally, those from safe countries of origin do not have a choice in 
moving away from the initial reception center until their case is fully processed and a decision is 
reached, thus forcing them to remain in centralized housing. There is also the somewhat well-
founded fear that decentralization may lead to ghettoization as certain nationalities of asylum 
seekers and refugees move to the same area. Still, for most asylum seekers and refugees, 
settlement in Germany is the only option for the time being with the prospects of returning home 
safely still years away. Settlement and a sense of belonging is something which can be facilitated 
by having independent, decentralized housing.  
 
Integration Courses and Advice Centers 
 Integration courses (Integrationskurse) are essentially required for all refugees and 
eligible asylum seekers, and a reduction of benefits is possible if an eligible person refuses to 
attend the course if deemed necessary by the BAMF office. BAMF typically organizes these 
courses, although occasionally private organizations like churches may host German language 
courses. There is an “obligation to attend if you cannot make yourself understood in German at a 
simple, adequate level.” 114 Successful completion of the integration course can increase chances 
of naturalization and obtaining a permanent settlement permit at a later date. These integration 
courses consist of two parts—language and orientation. The goal of both of these elements is to 
best orient the asylum seeker in their life in Germany, with multiple versions of the course being 
offered based on an individual’s unique situation and interests. The language instruction part of 
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the integration course is designed to be practical and applicable in real life scenarios, with 
language instruction accounting for approximately 90 percent of the course lessons. According to 
BAMF, the course “will cover aspects of everyday life such as work and career, basic and further 
training, bringing up and raising children, shopping/trade/consumption, leisure time and social 
interaction, health and hygiene/human body, media and media use, and housing.”115 The 
orientation portion of the integration course takes up the remaining 10 percent or so of lesson 
units, with this portion focusing on “the German legal system, history and culture, rights and 
obligations in Germany, forms of community life, and values that are important in Germany, 
such as freedom of religion, tolerance and gender equality.”116 
Specialized courses are available for those with limited literacy with such courses putting 
an emphasis on teaching the participants how to read and write while other specialize in teaching 
students learning German from a non-Roman alphabet language. Other courses include those 
specifically for women taught by women, for parents, and for young adult under the age of 26. 
Courses are also offered for those with some knowledge of German in the form of “catch-up” 
courses, and for those working or studying full time, an intensive course may be a better option. 
The ESF-BAMF Program transitioned from a temporary, pilot program into a program available 
nationwide for those interested in learning job specific German training in combination with 
vocational school education in lieu of the typical integration course.117 Overall, these programs 
are aimed at assisting asylum seekers and refugees in becoming involved in the German labor 
market as well as in civil society. Two tests exist to prove the students’ knowledge from the 
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integration course. The “German language test for immigrants” (DTZ) tests proficiency in 
German, and a separate exam titled “Life in Germany” tests for understanding of the material in 
the orientation portion of the course. By passing these two exams, a participant is then eligible 
for a certificate verifying their completion of the program.118 
 These courses range in length from 430 lesson units for a fast-track, intensive program to 
700 lesson units for the average program and as many as 1,000 lesson units for the specialty 
programs.119 Currently, most enrolled in these courses are required to pay €2.20 per lesson unit, 
meaning an average, 700 lesson unit course will cost €1,540. Naturally, these courses necessitate 
an enormous commitment of time and energy as well as a financial barrier, and many are 
excluded from participation if deemed not likely to receive asylum. For the most part, integration 
courses are only offered to those asylum seekers with good prospects to stay, ethnic German 
repatriates, and those which have already been granted asylum. Those with tolerated (Duldung) 
status and individuals with poor prospects of being granted asylum due to their country of origin  
as well as those from a country of origin deemed to be safe are typically not able to take the 
integration courses offered through BAMF and instead must rely on private, non-federally 
funded resources to gain access to language courses.120 It is necessary for most anyone wishing 
to enter the workforce in Germany to have a minimum of a basic working knowledge of the 
German language, and this has proven to be particular difficult for those excluded from the 
BAMF courses but legally permitted to live and work in Germany until they may safely be 
returned to their country of origin. Other obstacles affect particularly marginalized groups of 
asylum seekers and refugees, for example women with children. The city of Soest notes that 
 
118 Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, “Integration Courses.” 
119 Ibid. 
120 Stadt Soest - Fachbereich Jugend und Soziales, “Kommunales Handlungskonzept zur Integration, ” 25.  
 Perkins 50 
women with children were significantly less likely to complete an integration course due to more 
traditional household roles many held such as needing to stay home and take care of children; for 
this reason, Soest recommends in the medium-term for childcare facilities to be set up 
specifically for children with a parent attending one of the integration courses.121 
 Where one is in the asylum process and their status also may have an effect on their 
willingness and ability to complete an integration course. A 2017 survey found that 60 percent of 
recognized refugees, 34 percent with tolerated status, and 31 percent still going through the 
asylum process had completed or participated in an integration course.122 A shorter length of stay 
for those still in the asylum process may account for these low percentages of participation, but it 
is still significant to consider barriers like those barring certain individuals from “safe countries 
of origin” to accessing language courses have the potential to negatively impact those which will 
eventually receive refugee status and be entitled to long-term residency in Germany. BAMF has 
made efforts to make integration courses more accessible by making information about 
integration courses and the broader support network available online through the BAMF NAvI 
webpage. This webpage is offered in both German and English and allows for asylum seekers 
and refugees to find further information on integration courses, course locations, advice centers, 
and authorities.123 This website offers up-to-date information with relevant locations, contact 
information, and specific information on the courses currently being offered in the region. Using 
Soest as an example, it is possible to locate both integration courses available and local advice 
centers. Table 3 below shows the current offerings for integration courses within 5 km of Soest 
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city center as of April 1, 2021 as shown on the NAvI website. The basic information given about 
each course is provided in the table.  
 
Table 3: Current Offerings for Integration Courses within 5 km of Soest (April 1, 2021) 
 
 
Source: BAMF NAvI Database124 
 
 This table shows what is publicly available and accessible to refugees and eligible asylum 
seekers that may be interested in enrolling in such a course. According to this data, in the Soest 
district there are 67 places out of 220 available in a variety of integration courses catering to 
 
124 Ibid.  
Course Type Time Hours 
per Week 
Current Module Places 
Available/Total 
General Integration Morning 20 Orientation 4/25 





Morning 20 Advanced Course 
Module 3 
4/15 
Repeater with Literacy Morning/ Afternoon 16 Repeaters’ Module 3/15 
Second Script Morning/Afternoon 12 Advanced Course 
Module 3 
7/16 
Repeater General Morning 20 Repeaters’ Module 12/25 
General Integration Morning/Afternoon 20 Basic Module 3 11/25 
General Integration Morning/Afternoon 16 Basic Module 2 9/25 
General Integration Morning 25  5/18 
General Integration Morning 20 Advance Course 
Module 2 
2/20 
Repeater with Literacy Morning 16 Repeaters’ Module 4/16 
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differing interests and needs. This means 153 of these spots are filled with students currently 
going through these integration courses. To put this into perspective, the population of the city of 
Soest as of 2019 was just under 50,000.125 Considering the city’s small size, these continued 
offering of integration courses in spite of the pandemic is rather impressive. The majority of 
these courses being offered in Soest are simply the general integration course, yet all are in 
different modules. Some specialized courses are also offered, including those learning a second 
script (from a non-Roman alphabet background) and courses with a literacy focus in addition to 
three repeater courses. It should be noted that the time commitment for all of these courses is 
essentially the equivalent of a part-time job, ranging from twelve hours to twenty-five hours per 
week. All of these courses are offered partially in the morning with only four being offered as 
morning/afternoon courses. The given data does now allow the determination of whether this 
lack of evening courses signals a lack of need in Soest, or whether it could mean the need for 
evening courses for individuals working during the day is not met in this area.  
 In addition to these courses, the BAMF NAvI database also shows local advice centers in 
a given geographic area. Advice centers vary in the types of organizations they are as well as 
what types of advice they offer, but many of these centers are religious organizations. Soest has 
two advice centers listed in this database—Workers’ Welfare Organization 
(Arbeitwohlfahrt/AWO) and Deaconship Germany (Diakonie Deutschland).126 Both of these 
organizations have multiple branches throughout Germany with a branch office in Soest. AWO 
is “a professional association for development of cooperation and humanitarian action within the 
framework of the German welfare organization” and “is committed to supporting marginalized 
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and disadvantaged groups.”127 As noted in this description, AWO does not specifically deal with 
asylum seekers, with asylum seekers being only one of the many marginalized and 
disadvantaged groups they work with. AWO Subdistrict Hochsauerland/Soest has multiple 
projects outside of providing legal advice for adult asylum seekers, including youth 
programming and project “Meet” which facilitates interactions between migrants and locals in 
order to develop a richer understanding of one another.128 Deaconship Germany Subdistrict 
Ruhr-Hellweg is a Protestant Christian group which also helps a variety of vulnerable 
populations, although they have extensive offerings available for asylum seekers.129 This 
particular organization offers both legal advice as well as psychological counseling for asylum 
seekers in need.  
 Integration courses, advice centers, and even housing all serve to assist asylum seekers 
and refugees in settling into their new lives in Germany successfully. All three of these elements 
have some federal component, with integration courses having the strongest connection to 
BAMF in particular as BAMF offices are typically the most responsible for organizing and 
funding these courses through the federal government. Initial housing is typically federally 
funded, but it is often run on the Bundesland level or lower. Advice centers represent the non-
public resources available to asylum seekers and the volunteers that help make the functioning of 
such organizations possible serve to welcome asylum seekers into German society. All of these 
initiatives have the goal of achieving successful resettlement of refugees in Germany by 
promoting integration, although integration here does not equate to assimilation. Integration 
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simply means the ability to function within the host society, which necessitates an understanding 
of the German language as well as the culture. This understanding is taught through integration 
courses, and the advice centers and stable housing policies help to ensure legal and physical 
security for asylum seekers. This abstract concept of security is just as important to integration 
efforts as language and cultural understanding; having a sense of security helps to ensure asylum 
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V. Recommendations 
 German asylum policy continues to adapt to the changing reality of asylum seekers in 
Germany, with today’s policy strongly reflecting the acknowledgement that just as asylum 
seekers greatly benefit from having the prospects of settling in Germany, the aging German 
workforce has the possibility to greatly benefit from young adults willing to learn and work. 
There exists today in Germany in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis the seemingly paradoxical 
nature of “demand and support” and “support and deter.” “Demand and support” is the more 
positive version of this paradox, as it highlights the privileges which asylum seekers are entitled 
to (support) in exchange for certain obligations like attending integration courses to continue to 
receive full benefits (demand). “Support and deter” seems to be the current state of asylum 
policy in Germany, with this mentality being to support those asylum seekers and refugees 
already in Germany but to deter those that have yet to arrive. This deter element is especially 
prevalent in considering the creation of safe countries of origin, with their citizens effectively 
now being unable to receive asylum in Germany. In years to come, policy makers and voters 
must decide whether or not continued deterrence of new asylum seekers and support of those 
already within Germany is feasible. 
 This decision will need to be reached potentially in the near future, according to the 
Federal Minister of the Interior Horst Seehofer.130 The 2016 EU-Turkey deal was able to prevent 
many asylum seekers from entering Europe by instead providing additional financial incentives 
to the Turkish government to keep asylum seekers within their borders. This deal has been 
neglected despite the continued global unrest which creates more displaced persons and refugees 
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each and every year. Seehofer fears the potential failure of the 2016 EU-Turkey deal, which may 
result from EU neglect, may cause another wave of asylum seekers and refugees to arrive at the 
European Union’s external borders and eventually Germany. If this does occur, which is quite 
possible, this potential influx of migrants must be planned and accounted for in advance. 
Existing policy must be able and ready to handle such a large wave again, especially in securing 
better and more humane solutions to emergency housing than what was seen in 2015 and 2016. 
The ability to rapidly expand the amount of integration courses in the event of another wave of 
asylum seekers is also necessary.  
 In the event of another large wave of asylum seekers, decentralization may not be ideal. 
The 2015 “refugee crisis” saw significant lags in federal action and funding which forced local 
groups to act and guess at what would be best to accommodate asylum seekers in the short-term. 
Decentralization and power given to the Bundesländer often lead to unequal implementation of 
policy, which is especially important to remember when considering the fact asylum seekers and 
refugees by definition of their status do not have a say in where they are directed to live and have 
their asylum application processed for the next several years. This location is determined by the 
Königsteiner Quota system and completely out of the control of the asylum seekers who must 
merely go where he or she is assigned. More centralization and better and more rigorous training 
and bias screening of BAMF workers would likely lead to more equal application of asylum 
policy, especially when considering decisions on whether or not to grant an individual asylum. 
Local biases certainly seep into local BAMF offices, as this federal office mostly consists of 
local employees each with their own biases and opinions. A move away from decentralized 
policy on asylum, especially with the Asylum Seekers Benefits’ Act, would see more equitable 
outcomes for asylum seekers and a better process overall. Currently, six years after the 2015 
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migration crisis, we are able to step back and look at the policies and practices of these offices to 
determine if implementation truly is fair and equitable, and necessary changes and reforms are 
able to be made during this lull in asylum seeker applications to create a better functioning 
system for when/if crisis strikes again.   
 Gaps in current research on support networks in Germany and internationally primarily 
lie in the lack of asylum seeker and refugee voices accounted for. These individuals are the most 
affected by policy decisions and the functionality of support networks, yet they are often left out 
of the conversation. More studies need to be created in order to interview current asylum seekers 
and refugees to fully and properly evaluate the effectiveness of the support network and its 
outcomes. Such a study could mimic Zepinic’s 2012 study comparing refugees’ perceptions of 
specific types of support from their host country (UK, Italy, and Germany), but for the German 
example, this study could use host Bundesländer instead of host countries. This would allow 
insights into what the differences in application of federal law through the BAMF office as well 
as difference in the application of the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act, but it would more 
specifically allow us to see how these differences are perceived by asylum seekers. Since the 
ultimate goal of integration policies is to benefit asylum seekers, it is essential to learn how 
asylum seekers view the implementation of certain policies as beneficial or even detrimental 
instead of simply making assumptions based on what is “best for asylum seekers” from an 
outsider’s perspective.  
 Another promising avenue of research in understanding application of asylum policy in 
Germany is looking at municipalities as a unit of analysis as opposed to the entire Bundesland. 
Municipalities within the same Bundesland may have drastically different outcomes in terms of 
successful resettlement and integration due to local personalities like politicians and non-
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federally funded support networks, yet data in this area is virtually non-existent. Individual 
municipalities have their own governments, but perhaps even more importantly the existence of 
particular non-governmental support organizations may play a huge role. These non-
governmental support organizations may be religious in nature or just generally concerned with 
welfare, with some being very specifically targeted to helping asylum seekers and others broadly 
helping disadvantaged communities. Even soccer has proven to be an informal support network 
for asylum seekers in Germany, so much so that in the report from the city of Soest “free time 
and religion” is considered one of the essential building blocks to successful integration of 
asylum seekers in Germany. Such clubs and associations have particular cultural significance in 
German civic society, and the participation of asylum seekers and refugees in these uniquely 
German spaces brings integration under the German Leitkultur model all the more promising. 
These informal networks are just as important as formal networks although often harder to 
measure. An attempt to analyze the peculiarities of formal, informal, federal, state, and local 
support networks on the level of several different municipalities would allow important insights 
into asylum policy. This research can help to prepare Germany and the international community 
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VI. Conclusions  
 Two peaks in asylum seeker applications stand out as outliers in Germany—the flow of 
asylum seekers fleeing from the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and then those fleeing conflict in 
Syria and other areas in the Middle East and Northern Africa in 2016. Although these two 
instances are drastically different in terms of the specific characteristics of the conflict, they 
serve as examples of asylum policies which work and those which do not work. Asylum policy 
unfortunately does not exist solely for the betterment of the lives of asylum seekers, as Germany 
is a democracy with voters and politicians that all have their own priorities which may not 
always include the best possible outcomes for asylum seekers. This was evident in the period 
preceding the 1992 peak in asylum seeker applications in Germany as politically Germany was 
considered to be a “non-immigrant country.” The 1992 surge in asylum seeker applications 
tested this idea, and for the next several years, conservative politicians were able to keep 
Germany as a “non-immigrant country” through policies that provided minimal levels of 
subsistence for asylum seekers and offering only tolerated (Duldung) status to the majority of 
those entitled to asylum under international law.  
 In 2005, the Residence Act served as a turning point marking Germany’s shift away from 
being a “non-immigrant country” and made integration a goal and responsibility of the federal 
government. In viewing integration as a marker of success, Germany began to note value in 
migrants and furthermore asylum seekers present and a part of society. The 2015 refugee crisis in 
Europe tested the systems already put into place in the early 1990’s and the untested 
liberalization in migration and asylum policy of the 2000’s, and for the most part, Germany did 
quite well. An important recent development is the understanding of the importance of providing 
some sort of legal certainty for those with Duldung status by allowing continued residency if 
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they are actively participating in vocational training and have the intention to enter the German 
workforce. This allows the certainty that early asylum seekers in Germany with this same status 
did not have, and this earlier uncertainty was correlated with further psychological distress of 
those already traumatized. By providing more certainty for asylum seekers in Germany today, 
there is the acknowledgement that successful resettlement and integration of asylum seekers and 
refugees into the German economy and society are beneficial for those asylum seekers in need of 
security and for Germany as a whole. This shift is promising, yet recent policies seem to alter 
paradoxically between supporting and deterring asylum seekers and refugees.  
 Support is a much more promising goal for these policies, and it is absolutely vital that 
those asylum seekers and refugees currently in Germany have access to as many resources as 
possible to secure themselves economically and socially including but not limited to suitable 
housing and robust integration courses. The element of deterrence is a bit perplexing and is 
illustrated in restrictions on who can and cannot attend BAMF integration courses and the shift 
from cash benefits to in-kind benefits. There is no evidence that integration courses and cash 
benefits pull asylum seekers to Germany in particular, but there is the political fear of “fake” 
asylum seekers taking advantage of the system. Exclusion from certain integration measures of 
those deemed unlikely to receive asylum has the potential to leave many behind, thus making the 
process of integration lengthier. Further research is needed to develop a holistic understanding of 
asylum policy and implementation in Germany in order to best prepare for the inevitable future 
influxes of asylum seekers into the European Union and Germany. Further research can help 
prepare for another wave of asylum seekers and the avoidance of another migration crisis.   
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